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Social change does not always equal social progress--there is a dark side of social movements. 
We discuss conspiracy theory beliefs –beliefs that a powerful group of people are secretly 
working towards a malicious goal–as one contributor to destructive social movements. Research 
has linked conspiracy theory beliefs to anti-democratic attitudes, prejudice and non-normative 
political behavior. We propose a framework to understand the motivational processes behind 
conspiracy theories and associated social identities and collective action. We argue that 
conspiracy theories comprise at least two components – content and qualities— that appeal to 
people differently based on their motivations. Social identity motives draw people foremost to 





● Conspiracy theories claim that a powerful group is secretly pursuing an evil goal 
● Conspiracy theories can foster anti-democratic social movements 
● Conspiracy theories attract people with both their content and qualities 





The dark side of social movements:  
Social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy 
theories 
 
Social change is mostly equated with social ​progress​ brought about by revolutionary 
movements such as the Arabic Spring or #MeToo. However, social change is often destructive. 
Take the rising U.S. anti-vaccination movement. While measles vaccination rates have been 
steadily decreasing in many parts of the U.S. [1], the numbers of measles cases have skyrocketed 
from 86 cases in 2016 to 1,282 cases in 2019 [2]. Recent statistics from Europe provide another 
example of potentially dangerous social change. The current European Parliament holds as many 
as nine far-right parties [3]. These parties include Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland, Italy’s 
The League and France’s National Rally [4] -- all of which exhibit xenophobic thought and 
pursue anti-Islamic political agendas [4–7]. What motivates social movements that threaten 
social health, economic prosperity, and democratic principles? We argue that conspiracy theories 
-- theories that a powerful group of people are secretly working towards a malevolent or 
unlawful goal [8**] can be one reason. Though not all conspiracy theories are wrong, irrational, 
or harmful for society, many of them are in fact closely intertwined with some of today’s most 
powerful, destructive social movements. For example, “The Great Replacement” conspiracy 
theory about a secret plot to ethnically and culturally replace White Europeans is one of the 
fastest growing far-right movements in Europe advocating to deport European immigrants [9]. In 
 
 
this article, we will explain how conspiracy theories can foster anti-democratic social 
movements. Our article will exclusively focus on the destructive social movements associated 
with conspiracy theories, although we do acknowledge that certain (true) conspiracy theories can 
foster democratic and progressive social movements such as anti-corruption movements. 
1. Conspiracy Theories as a threat to democracy 
While healthy skepticism of government and elites is necessary for a functioning 
democracy, beliefs in certain conspiracies can pose a serious threat to democracy. Conspiracy 
theory beliefs  are linked to political alienation and cynicism [10–12], decreased intentions to 
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volunteer for a charity [13] and demotivate people to engage in normal, democratic practices [see 
14] like voting [15, but see 16].  
Conspiracy theories can even motivate unlawful anti-democratic political behavior (e.g., 
attacking people in power; [17**,18]. Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to right-wing 
authoritarianism [19], political extremism across the political spectrum [20] and grandiose 
beliefs about the nation [21, 22, 23*]. 
People holding stronger conspiracy theory beliefs are more open to everyday crimes [24] 
and hold stronger hostile intentions towards outgroups [23*]. For instance, Jewish conspiracy 
theory beliefs are related to prejudice and discrimination against Jewish people [25-28] and 
several other outgroups [29**].  
2. ​  ​The two motivational allures of conspiracy theories: content and qualities 
1 ​Studies differ in their focus on beliefs in real-world conspiracy theories, novel conspiracy theories, conspiracy 
thinking, and conspiracy mentality. It goes beyond this paper to discuss and address psychological differences 




To understand why and how conspiracy theory beliefs fuel anti-democratic social 
movements it is crucial to understand their motivational underpinnings and relationship to social 
identity. Recent reviews [30,8**] distilled three main motivators behind conspiracy theory 
beliefs: conspiracy beliefs are higher when people want to (1) feel good about themselves and 
the groups they belong to [31,32, 21], (2) make sense of their environment [33–35], or (3) feel 
safe and in control [36–38].  
Yet, an overarching framework that captures how these motives are linked to belief in 
conspiracy theories is missing. We propose that conspiracy theories comprise at least two 
motivational allures – content and qualities – that draw people toward them. We argue that 
motives behind conspiracy theories are qualitatively different for those who are enticed by the 
content of the conspiracy theory as opposed to those enticed by the qualities of the conspiracy 
theory. Using this distinction, also clarifies the relationship between different motives (e.g., 
social identity motives, uniqueness motives) and conspiracy theory beliefs. Social identity 
motives draw people foremost to the content of a conspiracy theory while uniqueness motives 
draw people foremost to the qualities of a conspiracy theory. 
 One may think about endorsing conspiracy theories like choosing a movie to watch. 
Someone who enjoys a good thriller might be more inclined to randomly pick a movie from the 
“horror” genre because its defining qualities (e.g., creepiness) promise to give them similar 
feelings. When and where the plot takes place might be inconsequential. Conversely, someone 
might be a fan of an actress (e.g., Julia Roberts) and picks a movie she’s starring in, regardless of 
its genre. Conspiracy theories can be understood as a genre of belief systems that is defined by 
certain qualities. Each individual conspiracy theory is a film with a unique content. 
 
 
Content ​ refers to the unique narrative elements of each conspiracy theory. While 
conspiracy theories all share the premise that a nefarious group is secretly working towards a 
malicious or unlawful goal, individual conspiracy theories vary in the specific group (e.g., 
Illuminati; government), which goal is pursued (e.g., New World Order, war) and which events 
can be explained (e.g., 2008 financial crisis, 9/11 terrorist attacks). This is similar to the contents 
of specific movies that people find appealing, like your favorite actor. 
Qualities​ on the other hand refer to the structural properties that all conspiracy theories 
have in common. For example, regardless of their specific content, most conspiracy theories are 
epistemic (i.e., explain most events) and counter-normative (i.e., challenge agreed upon 
knowledge). This is similar to the specific qualities that define a genre of movies and that certain 
people find appealing, like the creepiness of horror movies or the silliness of comedy movies.   
We argue that depending on context and motivational states, different contents or 
qualities are more alluring. For instance, people who are prejudiced against Muslims might be 
motivated to believe any sort of false information that presents this group in a negative light, 
including conspiracy theories. This is consistent with evidence that participants’ beliefs in 
conspiracy theories depended on who the alleged conspirator was [39, 40, 41**]. In contrast, the 
belief in a flat earth might primarily emerge from the psychological benefits of holding 
contrarian beliefs rather than compelling physical arguments. This is consistent with findings 
that participants who believed in one conspiracy theory were also more likely to believe in 
others, even when they were contradictory [42, 43]. 
We illustrate our argument by the means of discussing two motives behind conspiracy 
theory beliefs in more detail: social identity motives and uniqueness motives. 
 
 
2.1. Content drawn motives: Social identity motives 
People are prone to form social identities in which group membership becomes part of 
the self. Social identities are connected with different motives including the need to hold positive 
beliefs about ingroups and negative beliefs about outgroups [44]. We argue that these motives 
draw people primarily to certain ​contents​ of conspiracy theories.   
Prior to the 2012 U.S. Presidential election, Democrats and Republicans equally expected 
that electoral fraud would occur. Once President Obama was re-elected, however, Republicans 
were more likely to believe that electoral fraud had occurred [45]. After the elections, fraud 
beliefs might have helped Republicans to uphold a positive partisan identity [see 46**]. In 
another line of research conducted in the United States, a chronic need for the recognition of 
national greatness (i.e., collective narcissism) was associated with a conviction that foreign 
governments (outgroup members), but not the U.S. government, are involved in conspiracies 
[21]. In both of these examples, the specific content of the conspiracy theory (e.g., who 
conspired) is crucial for its appeal.  
In these cases, conspiracy theory beliefs psychologically greatly overlap with other kinds 
of false beliefs and can be explained by affiliated psychological models. For instance, in line 
with the identity-based model of political beliefs [46**], social identity motives increased 
participants’ likelihood to believe in fake news that represented their own political party as moral 
[47]. Likewise, participants were more likely to believe conspiracy theories that aligned with 
their party’s political stances and vilified the opposite party [39–41,48,49,50]. Sometimes people 
may be predominantly drawn to conspiracy theories because their content allows them to 
legitimize and enforce pre-existing beliefs and attitudes.  
 
 
2.2. Quality drawn motives: Examples of Epistemic & Uniqueness Motives  
Various psychological needs may draw people to conspiracy theories, primarily because 
their ​qualities ​ promise [see 30] to meet these needs. For instance, conspiracy theories imbue 
events with meaning and help people to make sense of events. Notably, research suggests that 
conspiracy theories might only be epistemically relevant when a situation is uncertain and 
conspiracy theory explanations are particularly salient [34; see also 52]. If alternative 
explanations for events are present, conspiracy theories can forfeit their epistemic allure. We 
take this as preliminary evidence that people sometimes turn to conspiracy theories foremost 
because of their qualities (here: ability to explain an event). 
Further, all conspiracy theories assert to know of secret information [32] and are 
unconventional (i.e., challenge social agreed upon knowledge and beliefs). This way, holding 
conspiracy theory beliefs means to be special and unique. Unsurprisingly, studies found that 
stronger uniqueness needs were linked to stronger conspiracy theory beliefs [31,32,36]. 
Important for our distinction between content and qualities, participants with high (vs. low) 
uniqueness needs were only more likely to believe in a novel conspiracy theory if it was 
supported by a minority (vs. majority) of people [31]. It seems that for people with high 
uniqueness needs, the content of the conspiracy theory could be secondary to its qualities.  
3. Implications and predictions for social movements 
The distinction between content and qualities allows us to make several predictions 
regarding conspiracy theory beliefs and associated social movements. For brevity, we discuss 
predictions pertaining to social identity motives and uniqueness motives.  
 
 
Social identity motives might be a major driver of conspiracy movements that are 
concerned with the loss of status such as “The Great Replacement”. Indeed, research suggests 
that people who believe in their group’s superiority but are anxious about its recognition are 
drawn to conspiracy theories about outgroup members [21, see also 22,23*].  
Social identity concerns might also foster social movements that advance political 
polarization and intergroup aggression. For instance, Republicans are more likely than 
Democrats to endorse Qanon – the far-right theory that a Deep State is conspiring against 
President Trump [53]. In contrast, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to believe that 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks were an inside job [54]. These differences might emerge from 
motivations to defend one’s ingroup from external threats and represent outgroups as morally 
inferior. Together with evidence that conspiracy theories that implicate outgroups can further 
prejudices, discrimination, and inter-group hostility [23,25–29] social identity motives might 
foster a vicious cycle where conspiracy theories intensify inter-group conflict and inter-group 
conflict fosters conspiracy theories. 
Uniqueness needs may be particularly relevant for understanding people’s engagement in 
fringe movements. People might be allured by these movements because their ideas are 
extremely unusual and non-normative rather than substantive (e.g., chemtrails) . Uniqueness 
2
needs may also partly explain why conspiracy theories are often connected to movements that 
deviate from democratic norms. Similar to why people with high uniqueness needs are more 
likely to choose unusual products [55], they might also be more likely to choose political actions 
that deviate from social norms (e.g., shadowing alleged conspirators). 
2 ​Conspiracy theory that water condensation trails from airplanes are actually trails of chemicals spread by the 
government (often: as a means to make citizen obedient). 
 
 
Our motivational distinction is a theoretical one. In the real world, none of the mentioned 
constructs operate in isolation. People are driven by multiple motives and conspiracy theories 
can meet these various motives at the same time. Further, motives can interact with each other, 
as can the content and qualities of conspiracy theories. This has important implications for the 
dynamics of conspiracy movements. For instance, the need for uniqueness may be understood as 
an innocuous pursuit of originality. However, by challenging official narratives conspiracy 
theories can actually undermine people’s trust in broader societal structures [cf. 56] leading to 
alienation and anomie [10-12, 57, 58] which in turn is linked to non-normative political activism 
[17**,18].  
Further, people are likely most allured by conspiracy theories and movements that 
promise to fulfill the highest number of relevant needs at the same time [see 30]. For instance, 
because liberals tend to have stronger uniqueness needs [59], they might be especially drawn to 
conspiracy theories and related movements that are both unpopular and identify the “correct” 
conspirators (e.g., business people [60]). 
4. Closing Remarks 
Conspiracy theories pose a threat to democratic systems. With the development of social 
media, conspiracy theorists acquired a new platform to spread unsubstantiated claims at an 
unprecedented rate and organize dangerous social movements. In fact, false information on 
Twitter travels faster and reaches larger audiences than accurate information [61]. Social media 
has allowed for destructive beliefs to spread and fester in large communities. For instance, within 
the same time period, the hashtag #Qanon has been used almost as many times (15 million) as 
#metoo, one of the most transformative social movements in recent memory. Recently, the FBI 
 
 
labeled Qanon as “conspiracy theory-driven domestic extremists” threatening domestic safety 
[62]. Motivationally distinguishing between content and qualities of conspiracy theories will be 
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Figure 1. Conspiracy theories comprise at least two allures: Content and Qualities. 
Conspiracy theories lure people with at least two different components – content and 
qualities. People who are enticed by the content of the conspiracy theory are driven by 
motives different to those who are enticed by the qualities of the conspiracy theory. The 
figure illustrates this process using social identity motives and uniqueness motives as two 
examples. Social identity motives draw people primarily to the content of a conspiracy 
theory. Uniqueness motives draw people primarily to certain qualities of a conspiracy 
theory. Both motives interact with each other and can foster each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
